

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0541

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: RECIPROCITY ISSUE

1. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS AS YET NO FINAL AGREEMENT AMONG WASHINGTON AGENCIES REGARDING CHANGE IN CURRENT US POSITION ON RECIPROCITY. AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE, WE WOULD SUPPORT THE NSC/STATE PROPOSAL MOST RECENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION WHICH LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ALLIES MAY LATER DECIDE TO ASK FOR RECIPROCITY. HOWEVER, AS WE SEE IT, IT IS NOW TOO LATE TO INTRODUCE INTO NATO ANY CHANGED POSITION IF THE WEST IS TO PRESENT OPTION 3 TO THE EAST PRIOR TO THE CHRISTMAS BREAK. TIMING CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE SET FORWARD IN MBFR VIENNA 0537, APPEAR TO MAKE IT IMPRACTICAL TO SEEK ALLIED AGREEMENT ON A SUBSTANCE CHANGE OF
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POSITION ON THE RECIPROCITY ISSUE IN THE NATO

POSITION PAPERS SINCE THIS WOULD INVOLVE CONSULTATION WITH SHAPE, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND NATIONAL CAPITALS.

2. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH WE MAY BE MISINTERPRETING ALLIED SILENCE ON RECIPROCITY, AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT SUCH A CHANGE WILL BE A REQUIREMENT FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT TO PUT OPTION 3 FORWARD. NO REPEAT NO ALLIED OFFICIAL IN VIENNA HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO EXPRESS CONCERN TO US ABOUT THE PRESENT US POSITION ON RECIPROCITY. NOR HAVE WE SEEN ANY INDICATION IN USNATO REPORTING THAT THERE ARE ALLIED CONCERNS ON THIS POINT SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS TO BLOCK ALLIED AGREEMENT ON OPTION 3. TO THE CONTRARY, BOTH UK AND FRG INCLUDED PROVISIONS ON RECIPROCITY IN THEIR MOST RECENT RTREATMENT OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF TIME URGENCY AND OF APPARENT ABSENCE OF PRESSURE FROM ALLIES TO CHANGE THE RECIPROCITY POSITION, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES REACH AGREEMENT ON TWO MAIN POINTS. THE FIRST WOULD CONCERN WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO THE ALLIES NOW. THE SECOND WOULD BE AN INTERNAL UNDERSTANDING AMONG WASHINGTON AGENCIES THAT THIS MOVE TO THE ALLIES WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO A FUTURE WASHINGTON DECISION ON WHETHER TO DROP RECIPROCITY AND THAT THE RECIPROCITY ISSUE WOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A FINAL RESOLUTION BY THE END OF JANUARY, WHICH IS THE EARLIEST IT WOULD BECOME TOPICAL WITH THE EAST.

4. AS REGARDS WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO THE ALLIES NOW, WE SUGGEST THAT THE US APPROACH THE FRG, WHICH HAS BRACKETED IN PARA 6 OF THE GUIDANCE, WITH A REQUEST TO DROP ITS BRACKETS ON THE BASIS OF THE RATIOALE BELOW. THE US COULD THEN GIVE THE SAME EXPLANATION IN THE SPC. IF IT APPEARED TACTICALLY ADVISABLE, THE US COULD ALSO INTRODUCE THIS LANGUAGE INTO PARA LLBIS OF THE ALLIED POSITION PAPER AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EXISTING BELGIAN LANGUAGE.

5. THE POINT WE WOULD SUGGEST MAKING TO THE ALLIES IS
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THAT THE STRINGENCY OF LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WHICH THE WEST CAN ASK FOR WITHOUT OVER-BURDENING THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THE OVERALL WESTERN PROPOSAL IS IN PART A FACTOR OF THE DEGREE OF INTEREST THE EAST SHOWS IN THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL AS WELL AS OF CONDITIONS WHICH THE EAST MAY RAISE IN ITS RESPONSE TO THAT PROPOSAL. THE WEST SHOULD THEREFORE AWAIT THE INITIAL INSTRUCTED EASTERN RESPONSE ON REDUCTION ASPECTS OF ITS

POSITION ON LIMITING ANALOGOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS
IN THE NGA.

6. OPERATIVELY, THIS LANGUAGE HAS THE PRACTICAL EFFECT
OF DEFERRING THE ISSUE OF LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEARS
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDING THE ALLIES A REASON FOR
NOT GOING INTO THE ISSUE FURTHER AT THIS TIME.

7. AS NECESSARY, THE UK AND FRG COULD ALSO BE TOLD THAT
THE US IS RECONSIDERING THE ENTIRE ISSUE. RESOR

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NNN

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